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JAPAN’S PARADOXICAL RESPONSE TO THE NEW
‘GLOBAL STANDARD’ IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
John Buchanan and Simon Deakin*

I. INTRODUCTION
At the end of the so-called ‘lost decade’ of the 1990s, Japan appeared to
be on the verge of a defining conflict between two competing conceptions
of corporate governance. On one side was ‘traditional’ Japanese corporate
governance, characterised by features such as the power of internally
promoted management to run large, listed companies with minimal
external supervision, concern with the company as a continuing
community, and a lack of direct attention to shareholder interests. On the
other side was the view that in order to restore the national economy to
good health, Japanese business needed to adhere to an emerging global
consensus in corporate governance (Ahmadjian, 2003, p.222). Impetus
was given to this view by the long series of corporate scandals that
emerged during the 1990s and beyond, which undermined public
confidence in corporate management as a whole. Key elements in the
Japanese conception of the ‘global standard’ – which were largely derived
from American practice notwithstanding their adoption by the OECD and
a number of transnational organisations and shareholder lobbying groups –
included an increased role for independent directors, a greater emphasis on
the monitoring role of boards, and the empowerment of shareholders; by
implication, power for shareholders would open the way to the
establishment of a market for corporate control, though this may not have
*
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been apparent to all. Many of these ideas were expressed in the Corporate
Governance Forum of Japan’s Interim Report on Corporate Governance
Principles, issued in October 1997 (JCGF, 1997). The tension between the
‘traditional’ and the ‘new’ appeared to crystallise further when the
‘company with committees’ system was introduced as a new optional
corporate governance regime through an amendment to the Commercial
Code in 2002, implemented in April 2003. The Japanese media described
the new system as ‘American’ even though no such precise system existed
in the USA (Nikkei, 2003), and were quick to observe a contrast between
‘innovative’ companies where the new system was adopted and
‘traditional’ ones where it was rejected or ignored. In this way the
Japanese debate over governance soon had the appearance of being framed
around two polar extremes (Ahmadjian, 2003, p.216).
In practice it is often unclear exactly what is meant by ‘traditional’
Japanese corporate governance, while the ‘global’ consensus represented
by the OECD principles of corporate governance masks considerable
differences in the law and practices of countries. However, it is not
difficult to see how the Japanese system found itself in conflict with what
seemed to be the new global norm. What is generally called ‘traditional’
Japanese corporate governance has its roots in the ‘corporate hegemony’
that evolved in Japan after the Second World War, whereby management
and labour each implicitly deferred their own immediate advantage for the
benefit of the firm, seeing it as the common source of their continuing
prosperity (Gordon, 1998, p.201). This created the ‘community firm’ as
the standard organisational form of the large, publicly-held corporation,
wherein a network of shared interests pulled the whole organisation
together at all levels (Inagami and Whittaker, 2005, pp.15-16).
Employment, at least among full-time staff, was generally stable, and an
unbroken line of promotions could lead a loyal and able employee to the
very highest board positions. In social and organisational terms, the firm
was internally focused, and the kind of self-seeking behaviour that agency
theory identifies was normally moderated by internal social pressures
rather than by a structure of contractual incentives or external monitoring
devices (Dore, 2005, p.441). At the end of the 20th century, the position of
shareholders still partially reflected their virtual disenfranchisement during
the early 1940s under Japan’s wartime economic reforms (Okazaki, 1996,
p.373); they were not generally regarded as the residual owners of the firm
in the sense which became commonly accepted in America in the 1980s
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(Jacoby, 2005, p.91). The result of these interlocking factors was to create
an internally focused style of governance that was self-regulating, hostile
to outside interference, and rooted in the belief that corporate planning,
management and execution formed an integrated process that could
neither be fragmented nor entrusted to outsiders.
A company president whom we interviewed in 2006 summarised this
outlook as follows:
‘I always say that there are broadly speaking three sets of stakeholders in
our company: one is the shareholders, another is the customers, and the
third is the employees, including the management. I think the most
important element of managing the company is to keep these three - this
triangle - in balance. In order to maintain that stability and proceed with
both growth and stability in balance with one another, a company, for
example, that just pays attention to its shareholders and continually applies
its profits to those shareholders will end up withering away at some stage
in the future’.
The ‘global standard’ that tends to be contrasted with this view is elusive
but the OECD’s 1999 guidelines point to a degree of international
consensus on best practice, which persists in its 2004 revised guidelines.1
Among the responsibilities of the board it is stated that: ‘the board should
be able to exercise objective judgement on corporate affairs, independent,
in particular, from management’. Participation of independent board
members in decision-making is recommended and ‘boards should assign a
sufficient number of non-executive board members capable of exercising
independent judgement to tasks where there is potential for conflict of
interest. Examples of such key responsibilities are financial reporting,
nomination and executive and board remuneration’. In its section on
shareholder rights, the OECD recommends that ‘markets for corporate
control should be allowed to function in an efficient and transparent
manner’ and that ‘anti-takeover measures should not be used to shield
management from accountability’ (OECD, 1999, pp.29-30 and 43-44).
1

Although it is questionable whether a ‘global standard’ really exists, the expression is
used here to indicate governance ideas influenced by the OECD guidelines or reminiscent
of US practice.
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The so-called company with committees system, which was introduced via
an amendment to the Commercial Code in 2002, introduced features that
were compatible with this approach. From the implementation of the law
in 2003, where companies chose to opt into the new model, they had to
place external directors on the board and ensure that that they formed a
majority in the three key committees that control nomination,
remuneration and audit. In addition, the new law theoretically drew a line
between the executive function of corporate management, and the
monitoring and supervising functions of the board. The daily running of
the company was to become the responsibility of executive officers whose
status and position was distinct from that of board-level directors. Many
would have agreed with the assessment of one commentator that these and
other changes, such as liberalisation of share repurchase and options, and a
general move towards non-mandatory rules, ‘marked a radical shift in the
fundamental ideas of Japanese corporate law. The new idea appears to be
a market-oriented one’ (Kozuka, 2006, p.9). Miyauchi Yoshihiko,
chairman of ORIX – which was one of the first companies to adopt the
new system – said in a newspaper interview in June 2003: ‘The
opportunity created by the Commercial Code amendment has for the
moment divided up those firms that take governance seriously and those
that do not’ (Nikkei Sangyō, 2003). The new Company Law which came
into force in 2006 is largely a codifying measure, formally removing
company law from the main body of the Commercial Code, but some
further changes to the rules relating to corporate governance have recently
been introduced, including a greater emphasis on the importance of robust
internal audit processes.
In addition to these legal changes, a further series of developments began
in 2005, as hostile bid approaches triggered litigation over the rights of
companies to implement defensive measures. Shortly after court rulings
had restrained frustrating tactics by a target company in March, the
Ministry of Justice and METI published joint guidelines on takeover bids
in May of that year. According to a widely held view, ‘Delaware law was
adopted wholesale’ in the guidelines, which represent ‘the intellectual
appeal of the Delaware model in the world today’; however, as Milhaupt
further observed, ‘Discerning the significance of Japan’s emerging
takeover market and related legal developments requires nuanced
comparative assessments of how legal standards and governance
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technologies whose evolution is deeply enmeshed with the U.S. political
economy will operate in a very different institutional setting’ (Milhaupt,
2006, pp.200-201 and 203).
In this paper we report empirical findings from case studies which were
aimed at examining the way in which companies have responded to these
legal reforms and other developments. Section 2 below sets out the
methods used. In Section 3 we present our findings under four headings:
varieties of board structure in companies with committees; perspectives on
external directors and corporate auditors; the impact of governance reform
on management structures and practices; and the reaction to the increased
possibility of hostile takeover bids. Section 4 assesses the empirical
findings.

II. METHODS
The case study interviews were carried out in September 2006. One
objective of the research was to investigate how far the polarised view of
‘traditionalists’ versus ‘modernisers’ was borne out at firm level. We
conducted interviews at a range of companies, some of which had
outwardly ‘traditional’ structures, and some of which were companies
with committees. We also discussed the same topics and situations with
representatives of external agencies which we considered to have the
ability to influence corporate governance behaviour, to have experience of
the formulation processes behind recent reforms, or to have knowledge of
market sentiment, in order to hear their views on the current situation and
gain some idea of the forces generally at work. In this connection we
spoke to a selection of academics who were active in governance studies
or had taken part in the consultation process for new legislation or
guidelines, government ministries, a politician, a major institutional
investor, a lawyer, various trade associations and two serving external
directors.
The study comprised 24 interviews. Of these, nine were conducted at eight
companies, comprising three companies with committees (four interviews)
and five other companies (five interviews), and 15 were conducted with
the external agencies above (15 interviews). This study was linked to a
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similarly constructed but wider exercise carried out in late 2003 and 2004
which compared actual governance practice to the theoretical style of the
formal or informal structural changes that many companies had recently
introduced at that time (see Buchanan, 2006, Buchanan, 2007). Since all
but two of the companies and several of the external agencies visited in
2006 had been visited also during the earlier exercise, much of these
discussions focused on comparison of the situations revealed in 2003-4
and those pertaining in 2006. Four of the corporate interviews were with
chairmen or chief executives and the others were with directors, senior
executive officers, corporate auditors and middle management.
All the interviews were conducted on a non-attributable basis. In all except
two instances they were recorded and transcribed, and Atlas-ti was used to
organise the data under code families for analysis. Further data quoted
here were obtained from published documents, principally the press,
corporate annual reports, and information issued by various trade and
business associations.2

III. CORPORATE RESPONSES TO COMPANY LAW
REFORM: CASE STUDY EVIDENCE
A. VARIETIES OF BOARD STRUCTURE IN COMPANIES WITH
COMMITTEES

As we have seen, the ‘company with committees’ model was held up by
its supporters in Japan as an exemplar of ‘global practice’. In practice, the
amendments made to the Commercial Code allowed several deviations
from the style of reform suggested by the OECD’s principles. There was
2

The work forms part of a wider project based at the University of Cambridge which is
analysing legal change and its relationship to financial development and organisational
change in a range of countries; although the approach adopted here is entirely qualitative,
it is intended to complement it with quantitative studies including the construction of
indices
measuring
legal
change
over
time
(http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/programme2/project2-20.htm).
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no requirement for a majority of external directors on the board, the same
external directors could serve concurrently on the three statutory
committees so that the minimum requirement was only for two, and it was
permissible for directors and executives to have joint roles. Moreover the
external directors could include officers of parent companies and are best
described as ‘external’ (the common Japanese term is shagai, meaning
‘external to the company’) rather than as ‘independent’. All the
companies with committees which we visited had taken advantage of these
effective derogations to some degree.
As at 21st December 2006, a net 105 companies had formally gone over to
the new system, while nine others had transferred but subsequently
reverted to the old system (JCAA, 2006); the total may seem small (and it
is inflated by the inclusion of at least 45 companies that are either
subsidiaries or firms under effective external control for other reasons),
but it includes some of the best-known of the globally-orientated Japanese
companies which came to the fore in the post-war period. We will
consider three cases which illustrate the variety of ways in which the
company with committees system operates in practice.
The first was a medium-sized listed company which was one of the first to
move over to the new system in 2003. The founding family continued to
hold a major shareholding, and a family member was its CEO; according
to a director, ‘there was no external pressure’ for the change, and ‘there
was a good deal of debate at first about whether proceeding in this way
was a good idea or not’, but ‘the CEO forced it through’. In the new
board, seven of the ten directors were external and five of these had
managerial experience; they appeared to be genuinely external,
independent and qualified to supervise the business. The company
appointed only three employees to the formal position of executive officer:
these were the president (CEO), COO (also a director), and the CFO.
Following the change, a clearer demarcation between supervision and
execution was established; as it was put to us, the two executive directors
‘have been made directors in order to explain to the board what the
executives are doing and what they plan to do’. Nevertheless, the threeperson executive committee decided issues of strategy such as mergers
and acquisitions, to the extent of determining whether to make hostile bids
for other companies. The director we interviewed described the situation:
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‘with the move to become a Company with Committees, what you might
call the big shareholders concentrated on supervision and the executive
officers actually ran the business - I think that’s frankly one way to look at
it’.
The second company, which is large and important in its field within
Japan, had four external directors (roughly 30% in a total board of 13)
who clearly met criteria of independence in terms of their previous careers
and declared interests. In addition, there was one other non-executive
director, who was an internal appointee. Two of the external directors had
management experience but the other two had been recruited for their
specialist knowledge. The chairman described his policy in selecting these
people:
‘We chose these specialists and professional businesspeople in order to
maintain a good balance in the management of our business and in our
governance. We felt that if they were here they would watch over our
business and conduct our governance for us…’
When asked whether they participated fully in decision-making processes,
his reply, while affirmative, stressed their advisory role:
‘Yes. They take part in it. That is, they come up with opinions all the time
at board meetings and you see we on the board pay a great deal of respect
to the opinions of these external directors.’
The perception was that the four external directors were a source of advice
for the nine internal appointees, and that ‘the board’ was somehow distinct
from these individuals.
The nomination and compensation committees each comprised the
company chairman (who was an executive director) as the committee
chairman, one executive director and three of the four external directors.
The audit committee comprised two of the external directors and the nonexecutive internal director as committee chairman. In none of these
instances, therefore, was a committee entrusted entirely to external
control, and in all cases the chairmen were internal.
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Although the separation of management from monitoring was clearly
acknowledged, the ambiguous position of the internal directors could not
be avoided. The chairman commented on his own executive role as
follows:
‘Now, really, I’m the chairman and it would really be better if I didn’t
have a joint role as an executive officer. You see I chair the board
meetings as the company chairman. Well, it would be consistent to do that
but, the way I see it, I feel that if I’m in a position of supervising I need to
have information about execution in order to supervise what they are
doing properly and in order to do this I need to see what is going on
among the executive officers, right down to the executive officer
meetings. It’s a sort of information gathering exercise.’
There appeared therefore to be an underlying belief that it is not possible
for the board to function without having a strong link to the executive arm.
In the case of the chairman, this amounted only to the need for an
‘information gathering exercise’, but all except one of the internally
promoted core of the board, who continued to drive the firm’s strategy,
were also executives.
The third company is very large and has a major international presence. At
the time of our interviews it had four external directors who met the
criteria for independence but none of them had direct industrial experience
and they could more readily be described as specialists than as managers.
In addition to these external directors, there were three internally
promoted non-executive directors, including the chairman, and seven
internally promoted executive directors, including the president, giving a
total board of 14 split equally between executives and non-executives.
The chairman described the logic behind this structure:
‘Our board has 14 members, but if we make the numbers equal, with
seven of each, even if - for the sake of argument - the executive directors
have to hold execution-side opinions, the board works on majority
decisions, so in the first place nothing happens unless there is agreement
there - so that’s why one aspect is that of numbers, with seven and seven.’
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The external directors’ role appeared to be seen as advisory: ‘we have
introduced specialists from all sorts of sectors, with their expertise, so
these people bring heavy-weight opinions….into our group of directors’.
The dual role of the internal directors as both managers and monitors was
explicitly recognised, but rather than being seen as a potential weakness,
was viewed as a strength of the new arrangements. The seven executive
directors comprised the president, the CFO, the chief risk management
officer and the four operational heads of the company’s main divisions,
thus ensuring that the company’s entire business spectrum was reflected in
its board: ‘the reason why we chose these seven is that they, including the
CEO, as directors must run each of their businesses from the viewpoint of
the stakeholders’. This was a conscious policy decision, as the chairman
explained:
‘Although our current structure differs from the American style, where the
CEO has become virtually the only one there with executive powers and
fundamentally, apart from him, it’s an external style of structure, we are
discussing matters by involving people who have a better familiarity with
how the company operates… it is not possible to reach decisions on things
like the company’s culture and matters of [similar] importance through
discussions with external directors’.
This contrast with what was seen as the paradigmatic American structure
was also emphasised by the chairman of the second company referred to
above:
‘Now we became a company with committees but precisely a Japanese
one. This is very different from an American company with committees’.
These first three situations illustrate the wide variety of forms which can
exist within the company with committees system. For the two large,
widely held companies, external supervision and advice were introduced
into what remained, essentially, executive boards aligned to the demands
of the businesses; for the first company it became a format for further
concentrating control of the business in the hands of a family CEO and his
closest subordinates, while providing a new element of external
supervision which was nevertheless of limited intensity. In all cases, the
site of decisive power had not significantly shifted.
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ON EXTERNAL DIRECTORS AND CORPORATE

AUDITORS

External directors are a compulsory element of the company with
committees system but they are also present at many other companies in
Japan. According to the Tokyo Stock Exchange’s survey of all TSE-listed
companies’ corporate governance returns from 2006 (published 2007)3,
42.3% of all TSE-listed companies had external directors and the figure
for those using the corporate auditor system, thus excluding those that are
obliged to appoint external directors by virtue of being companies with
committees, was 40.83%. The average number of external directors for
those companies with corporate auditor systems that had appointed any
was 1.76 per company (TSE, 2007, pp.14-15).
Although there is a tradition of inviting outsiders to participate in Japanese
boards they are seldom seen as independent agents. The TSE white paper
quoted above reported that 82.7% of external directors at all TSE-listed
companies were persons who had retired from unaffiliated companies 4,
with all but 5.1% of the remainder being specialists of some kind (TSE,
2007, p.18) but this would not exclude persons from companies with
trading relationships. A major Japanese institutional investor summarised
common perceptions when interviewed in 2004:
‘...they all come from trading partners or banks or insurers. They all have
some inter-group, mutual transaction background to them. There are not
many of them and they are not independent. Then there’s the question of
what they actually do: external directors are there to check the
management of the firm with external eyes but they hardly ever carry out
that function. In Japan, they are advisers.’

3

Data were obtained from corporate returns responding to question lists published by the
exchange; where responses were textual, keyword searches were used.
4

As defined in terms of shareholding and special ability to influence decisions.
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In the particular case of 318 companies where a specific parent company
was identified, 65.7% of the external directors appointed came from the
parents, suggesting that promoting group cohesion, rather than being
independent, was the main function of these candidates (TSE, 2007, p.20).
A company president we interviewed in 2006, who had no external
directors in his company but had recently created an advisory board,
summed up what is probably the general view among those in favour of
external involvement when he described his new advisors:
‘There’s an element of externalism in this structure as well: this aspect of
reflecting all these people’s opinions in our management is perhaps not the
same as the external board members that you were talking about, but in the
sense of being a mechanism that reflects what is in many respects a breath
of outside air and outside thinking onto our internal organisation, I think
it’s a very useful thing’.
One of his board colleagues added this clarification: ‘the sum of it is that
when they give opinions that provide advice, the president is ready to
listen to them, but I don’t think there is an aspect of constraining the
president’s power present there’.
Several persons interviewed commented that there was a lack of suitable
candidates for external directorships. An officer of an association
commented, in the context of a discussion of the concentration of power
among the committees in the company with committees system: ‘you see,
the reason that the committees were given precisely such powers is
because it was not possible to externalise half of the whole board of
directors’. An officer at another association made a similar comment: ‘As
a practical issue, the supply of suitable candidates for external directors the supply of appropriate people - is limited’.
Even when candidates could be found, there was doubt as to their
suitability. The officer of the second association quoted above observed
that companies which had initially become companies with committees
and had then reverted to the ‘traditional’ style had told him that ‘there
were still all sorts of weaknesses and faults’ with regard to how far the
external directors understood the running of the companies, their grasp of
the actual situation and their ability to make appropriate decisions. A
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lawyer who had acted as an external corporate auditor commented on this
problem from the other side:
‘Generally lawyers and accountants are potential candidates for
independent directors and auditors. Certainly we’re independent but not
good at business - at understanding’.
An officer at one of the above associations recounted the story of one such
candidate:
‘This is something that we have actually heard from senior management at
a company: that company appointed a jurist with experience as a high
court judge. So he was very useful in setting up compliance matters
regarding the company’s legal side but he had no idea about what was
going on in the company….So he was called ‘external director’ but the
fact was that he was just a legal adviser’.
Some companies, mostly companies with committees, do give their
external directors a degree of real power and the external directors at Sony
are popularly credited with expediting their company’s change of CEO in
2005. However, in the interviews which we conducted, external directors
were often described as isolated within the companies in which they held
office. A corporate auditor at a company with external directors which was
not a company with committees observed:
‘I think they feel they’re very isolated. They do not have access routes to
the real company. They see something like a virtual company which is
pure and 100% perfect, and they are asked to make a judgement, and I
think they sometimes feel very uncomfortable about this situation’.
One external director, who enjoyed great prestige from his earlier career
and was both an external director and an external corporate auditor at
several companies, told us:
‘At other companies where I am an external director, the number of
externals is small, so the situation is that there’s a feeling of their being
outsiders’.
He continued:

14
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‘The externals are not determining the companies’ strategy…. They can’t
do that. You see, people who have been in the company for a long time,
who bear executive responsibility, put together the strategy, then they
obtain the approval of the external people on the board of directors, the
matter is decided and then they implement it’.
This view was substantiated by the president of a medium-sized listed
company which is not a company with committees but has appointed some
external directors. When asked about these external directors’ direct
involvement in major issues, he said:
‘Actually, to give an example, with strategy - when we decide the midterm plan, for example - we get them to give final approval but they are
not involved in the process of deciding it. That is decided internally’.
Moreover he and his internal directors met once every two weeks for a
discussion of major business and administration issues without involving
their external colleagues.
When the move to the company with committees system was opened to
public discussion by METI and the Ministry of Justice around 2001, the
principal employers’ association, the Keidanren, made its opposition to
compulsory introduction of external directors very clear (Imai, 2001) and
this is believed to have been a major reason why the system was launched
as an option only. A civil servant offered a personal opinion on the general
situation regarding external directors:
‘…while externals have appeared on the business scene in our country’s
rather particular situation, unless the restrictions that come from the
lifetime employment system and from the kind of people who become
directors are somehow broken, whoever is brought along as an external,
the exercise is pointless. You see, there has hitherto been enormous
sensitivity - indeed there still is - towards the fact that these people are
external, that they haven’t worked at the company. This aspect is perhaps
one where our approach is very different from the debate in America,
Europe or the OECD about requirements for external and independent
directors. In other words, the fact that these people have not worked for
the CEO has now become the most important issue in this country. Now
this being as it is, when it comes to deciding how to take things forward,
this has hitherto been a matter of great importance and, as such, it has
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aroused very strong resistance, but what we have to do is to advance
slowly, step by step, in this direction, changing the system.’
Several of those interviewed emphasised aspects such as ‘lack of
suitability’ or the lack of supply of ‘suitable’ candidates as problems and
this raises the question of what ‘suitability’ might entail. The main criteria
that emerged in our interviews were: understanding of the company’s
operations, understanding of what was happening day-to-day, and the
ability to make informed decisions. Familiarity with the CEO was a
further factor noted by the civil servant quoted above. The sort of person
most likely to fulfil all of these requirements would be precisely an insider
who had spent an entire career at that company; this is clearly not an easy
role for an outsider to undertake. Not unsurprisingly, members of
management whom we met, most of whom had been internally promoted,
held views about the desired characteristics of corporate directors which
were largely attuned to their own backgrounds. External directors who
have no pretensions to be other than purveyors of specialist advice
probably fall into a different category: they appear to be isolated from the
real governance of the companies on whose boards they sit by implicit
mutual consent.
What of the great majority of companies which had not moved over to the
new system and still theoretically rely on corporate auditors to supervise
their governance? In several cases in our sample, these companies had
adopted elements of the companies with committees structure, including
often the creation of an executive officer class below board level and the
introduction of external directors on to the board, while retaining the
characteristic feature of the traditional regime: a board of ‘corporate
auditors’ with responsibility for overseeing the main board. The corporate
auditor system had been strengthened in legislation of the early 2000s
which made the appointment of outsider auditors mandatory. There were
some who argued, like the chairman of one company with committees,
that:
‘At the end of the day, corporate auditors can’t function, you know. You
see, in Japan, old-style corporate auditors have been dragged into the
present unmodified. What use are people like corporate auditors? There
are plenty of them who don’t know anything about auditing – they cannot
make judgements, you see’.
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However, others argued that the corporate auditor system, by bringing
together insiders (normally former executives) with outside auditors, and
with a clear division of responsibility between execution and supervision,
was working well. A corporate auditor commented:
‘I think a good point of the corporate auditor system is the combination of
internal auditors and external auditors. I think that the function of auditors
is to provide a final resource to the members of the board [of directors].
What I would like to say is that we have outside [corporate audit] board
members who really are professionals. We have outside corporate auditors
who are super-high flying managers… These big high-flying – how do
you say? “VIPs”? - can say something to the management. I think they can
- simply because they are members of the board of auditors - give a
message to the board of directors of the companies. If something wrong is
going on, then we internal auditors can speak to the outside auditors and
then the outside auditors can speak in a board meeting. That cycle, or that
safety valve, is really working.’
What this suggests is that a large range of companies, some of which have
gone over to the new system and some of which have not, have
implemented a greater stress on external monitoring, whether in the form
of external directors or through the amended corporate auditor system.
External directors and auditors alike are seen as having an important role
as advisers and as a ‘safety valve’ for management. However, in both
instances there is a perception of limits to the effective action which
outsiders can take on strategic matters, which arises from the importance
attached to knowledge and experience of the internal workings of the firm.

C. THE

IMPACT OF GOVERNANCE REFORM ON MANAGEMENT
STRUCTURES AND PRACTICES

The firms we interviewed who had moved over to the company with
committees system all identified greater streamlining and efficiency of
decision-making as one of the main consequences of their decision. This
stemmed from a number of factors: clarifying the monitoring role of the
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board and, conversely, removing from it certain executive functions,
which were now vested in executive managerial structures; and
establishing the new class of executive officers below the level of board
director. As one company told us, ‘the first objective in becoming a
company with committees like this was to speed up the decision-making
and to be able to transfer all the authority to the executive officers…that
was the big thing’.
In the case of one large company with committees mentioned in section A.
above, executive committees were restructured following the adoption of
the company with committees structure. The board, as described
previously, was set up with equal numbers of executive and non-executive
directors. Of the non-executives, three, including the chairman, were
former executives; these were members of the main executive committee
and were entitled to attend its meetings and to see the process by which
the president arrived at a final decision. In this way, a link to the wider
board was provided. When asked whether these new arrangements were
translating into results for the company, our interviewee, a senior
executive officer, replied:
‘Yes. I think it’s fair to say that by having the schematic or the
organisation of these layers today here at [the company], plus having a
CEO like [the then incumbent], I can say that we now have a very efficient
process for big decisions and also very good communication with the
executives of the various companies to guide - to lead - their management,
not only in the day-to-day operation but also as a kind of discussion
regarding the direction of their marketing and the businesses. I think it is
already working and as you see already [in] the bottom line of our profit
and loss statements, [the company] has changed.’
However, this point of view was not confined to companies with
committees. In several other companies, similar moves had been taken.
In one company which had no external directors at all, an executive officer
category had nevertheless been established below board level. A member
of middle management observed: ‘We introduced this management system
and actually the purpose of this new reorganisation is the speed-up of our
business operations – that means a quick business machine – plus
clarification of the role and responsibility of our top management’. The
new management structure, which had been put in place at roughly the
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same time that the company with committees law came into force, set out
in detail the structures by which senior management committees reported
to the board and received feedback; the role of auditors (who were seen as
advising but not as having a veto over decisions); and the role of an
international advisory board. This was not a company which placed great
emphasis on transparency to outsiders regarding all aspects of its
management processes: on the contrary, the purpose of the international
advisory board was to help management, not to reassure shareholders.
The reform of managerial structures in large Japanese companies may, in
some cases, have been triggered by the legal reforms of the early 2000s,
but it was not confined to companies opting into the new structure.
Companies such as Toyota and Canon which had refused to move over to
the new system were seen by other corporate managements as having less
need to do so, on the grounds that they had already implemented many of
the structural changes which, elsewhere, were delayed until the onset of
more structural corporate governance reform. As the chairman of a very
large company in an unrelated sector put it,
‘The point here – I don’t know whether one should call it an omission – is
that, for example, companies like Toyota and Canon, from our point of
view, are some of the first movers among Japanese companies and began
to change their business structures early on: probably in the beginning of
the 1990s, they responded very quickly to a sort of globalisation and
spread of networking, with the result that they came to have very sound
structures. Now although the top people at these various companies talk a
lot about their Japanese-style management, in fact from that time they
were already building a management style and structure suited to the
environment of the 21st century. That’s why the companies that are not
making efforts to reform their corporate governance further are the
companies that currently have good results and began to reform their
structures 10 years back.’
There were other views. Some of our respondents took a line which was
more fundamentally opposed to the traditional model and to the idea that it
could successfully adapt to changing demands in an incremental way.
According to one of our interviewees, who served as an external director
and external corporate auditor in several different companies,
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‘In Japan in a strict sense there is no management, there are just people in
companies who are just cooperating – there is no real tough management
and there is no leadership – just cooperation. So there is no real
management as a modern management system – in the modern meaning of
‘management’. So people don’t think we need corporate governance. If
there is no management, then no governance. It’s very typical – very
symbolic.’
Related to this was the view, put to us by an institutional investor, that
even in companies which had appointed external directors, little had
changed:
‘Even though external directors are introduced just as an outward form,
there is still no supporting structure, no organisation to allow these people
to function properly. So they are just being introduced as a façade. There
are a lot of companies that are just adding them as a decoration. Therefore
when one carries out a questionnaire survey there are companies that
appear to be good in purely external terms, but in reality, when one does
not rely just on these questionnaires and actually goes to visit and asks all
sorts of questions, this turns out to be just a façade: the contents are not
working, they are not functioning, and there are plenty of companies like
that, you know. That’s why I don’t pay attention to this kind of
information now. You see there are still many companies like this in Japan
which are just attaching a façade, just decoration.’
A politician whom we interviewed emphasised Japan’s historical cycle of
periodic governance reform in response to scandals and the need for
continuing reform henceforth to ensure that the current situation does not
prove to be merely a repetition of this:
‘Later on - though I hate to say it - scandals occur so everyone is criticised
for these and then we have tension once more: this is just not a systematic
way of doing things. It’s an external pressure: scandals occur, so all that
happens is that there is tension once again and we take a new look at
things and we strengthen them. My feeling is that if we just leave matters
as they are, there’s a danger that they will gradually stop functioning in
line with the formal façade’.
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Whether a fundamental change is occurring in Japanese managerial
practice is difficult to judge from the evidence that we have. We can
nevertheless point to significant differences in perceptions of the
relationship between governance reform and managerial change. Senior
managers of some of the very large companies which have long played a
dominant role in the Japanese economy see governance in instrumental
terms, that is, as a means to the end of putting in place the kind of
streamlined decision-making structures which were thought to be
impossible under the traditional system. The diminution in the size of
boards (some of which used to have as many as 50 or 60 members in
extreme cases) and the separation of execution and monitoring were,
according to this point of view, the much-needed catalyst which enabled
senior managers to initiate overdue organisational reforms. This view is
posed against a position, associated with some institutional investors and
those who have long argued for a closer alignment of the Japanese model
with American practice, which doubts whether any significant changes
have taken place in corporate culture and practice, and which sees the
governance reforms of the 2000s as cosmetic, precisely because they did
not go far enough to enhance transparency and external accountability.
Which view of the trajectory of Japanese corporate governance turns out
to be correct remains to be seen. One indication that certain large
companies may well have made more than superficial changes is the
recognition on the part of senior management that the process of reform is
by no means risk-free. The ‘traditional’ system depended on the capacity
of a large group of managerial insiders to oversee, through mutual
monitoring, the performance of the small number among them who had
climbed to very top of the managerial structure. Thanks to the separation
of the executive officer class from board-level directors, and the reduced
opportunities for promotion to board level which this, together with the
reduction in the size of boards, implies, this kind of monitoring will be
less feasible in future. It was put to us that the concentration of excessive
power in the hands of CEOs might make it more difficult to guard against
the possibility of strategic errors and mismanagement at top level.
Another problem pointed out to us was the need to ensure the formal
systems of internal controls which were replacing the informal system of
mutual monitoring were truly effective, as the chairman of a very large
company (which has in fact recently reinforced its internal inspection
function) suggested:
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‘The one thing that I am personally worried about, that I feel needs to be
done, is strengthening of our internal control system… At our current level
of audit competence, I have the feeling that the arrangements we have put
in place for auditing perhaps lack the ability to move in on the real heart of
problems, that our audits are maybe a bit superficial. It may be that I am
seeing problems where none exist but I feel that we need to improve our
audit competence a little bit more and that we need to give it more ability
to seek out things such as dealing with intrinsic dangers in the organisation
before they become problematical and looking at the business with regard
to illegalities. So that’s why I think that we should continue with our board
governance arrangements just as they are for a while but I would like to
look a little more closely at matters surrounding internal controls.’

D. REACTION

TO THE INCREASED POSSIBILITY OF HOSTILE

TAKEOVER BIDS

The corporate governance debate in Japan is no longer quite as intense at
it was in the early 2000s. Although the topic is still discussed, it no longer
features so regularly in the press as an urgent matter. A close observer of
the Japanese corporate scene told us:
‘Stock prices have improved dramatically compared to 2003, the overall
economy has improved - that’s taken some of the pressure off. A lot of the
impetus for focus on corporate governance reform was really the
underperformance of the equity markets and the implications that had for
the Japanese pension system’.
A civil servant commented on the current situation regarding companies’
choices between different governance systems: ‘…how things will move
is perhaps not clearly established: there’s still fluidity with regard to which
way all the pieces will move, and it’s probably necessary to wait a while
to see how they settle down’. Public attention has focused more recently
on a single but nevertheless critical aspect of wider corporate governance:
anti-takeover strategies and defences.
Because most large Japanese companies are widely-held joint stock
companies as well as community firms, a fundamental inconsistency exists
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between their legal structure and the practice of most corporate
managements. Ownership of these companies is vested in freely
negotiable shares, but both management and workforce tend to resist the
idea of outsiders taking sudden control of the company by buying a
majority of these shares and then threatening to interfere (as they would
see it) in the running of the business. In the past, one solution was to
encourage stable shareholdings by trading partners, often in the form of
mutual cross-shareholdings, which were already an accepted way of
demonstrating a long-term business association between companies.
During the period 1965-1974, when weak equity prices and market
liberalisation measures caused concern that foreign or domestic predators
might seek control of Japanese companies, these shareholdings increased
sharply: the overall stable shareholding ratio of listed companies
(including cross-shareholdings) is estimated to have risen from 47.4% in
1965 to 62.2% in 1974 (Miyajima and Kuroki, 2005, pp.5-6). However,
these shareholdings were already in decline by the early 1990s, leaving
many companies with increasingly liquid shareholder bases. Statistics
from NLI Research (Nissei Kiso Kenkyūjo) show a decline in stable
shareholdings by market value in a population of listed companies
numbering 2,161 in 1993 and rising to 2,690 in 2003, from 45.2% in 1993
to 24.3% in 2003. Pure cross-shareholdings, which are included within the
stable shareholding totals, declined from 17.6% in 1993 to 7.6% in 2003
(NLI Research, 2004).
In February 2005 Livedoor, an internet services provider, tried to take
control of Nippon Broadcasting System (‘NBS’), a radio broadcaster,
through a hostile bid. This attempt proved to be a watershed in the recent
history of mergers and acquisitions in Japan whose ‘net result was not a
return to business as before’(Whittaker and Hayakawa, 2007. p.16). A
great attraction of the target was the fact that NBS, through a crossshareholding arrangement, was the dominant shareholder in Fuji
Television, which in turn dominated the Fuji-Sankei media group. Various
factors made this attempt, which was ultimately thwarted, a stimulus for
widespread anti-takeover precautions by companies across Japan. The first
alarming factor was that Livedoor, despite assurances to the contrary,
appeared to be predatory and speculative: its approach was reminiscent of
the greenmailers who had extorted money from Japanese companies in the
1970s and 1980s, and Okuda Hiroshi, chairman of Toyota and of the
Keidanren, immediately drew a parallel with T. Boone Pickens’ attempt
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on Koito Seisakusho in 1989-1990 when he acquired shares from a
suspected Japanese greenmailer and demanded board representation.
Speaking as Keidanren chairman, Mr. Okuda is reported to have said that
Livedoor’s president should clarify whether he was seeking to restructure
Fuji Sankei Group or was simply trying to make a speculative profit, like
T. Boone Pickens – the implication being that, in the latter case, society
should close ranks against him (Nikkei, 2005a). The second alarming
factor was that when NBS sought to dilute Livedoor’s shareholding by
issuing new share rights, two courts successively declared this move
illegal. At least one fairly recent precedent existed which should have
warned NBS’s management that such a move might not be permitted but
the effect was to remind boards across Japan that their legally permitted
ability to issue authorised but hitherto unissued shares or to distribute
rights without shareholder approval was not a sure defence against hostile
takeover. It is interesting that a small-scale snap survey by Nihon Keizai
Shimbun at the time found that a majority of the company presidents and
all the investors polled considered that the courts’ decisions were correct
(Nikkei, 2005b).
The situation was considered sufficiently serious for the Ministry of
Justice and METI to issue joint guidelines in May 2005 in an effort to
show what sort of anti-takeover defences might be considered in the
corporate interest and what levels of external supervision might be
appropriate to sanction the actions of internally promoted directors in this
regard (METI and MOJ, 2005). A civil servant described the thinking
behind this move:
‘Ultimately, unless the judgement is one that includes external people, it
will not be clear whether these actions are lawful or not. The incumbents
might make a correct judgement but the important thing is to demonstrate
that it is correct…At the end of the day this is a guideline - a guidance for
people’s reference - and it has no legal power of compulsion, but it sounds
a warning bell for people at companies and is intended to make them
understand that this is a topic where they need to make an effort not to be
suspected of acting unlawfully’.
In July 2006 there was a further demonstration that companies were not
safe from hostile attentions when Ōji Paper approached Hokuetsu Paper
with a view to buying the company and then launched a hostile bid when
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its offer was refused. Hokuetsu’s strategy was to cultivate local financial
and political relationships and ultimately to allocate sufficient new shares
to Mitsubishi Corporation and Nippon Paper that by the end of August
2006 Ōji had no hope of acquiring a majority shareholding and withdrew
its offer. Perhaps mindful of NBS’s problems with the courts and of the
recent official guidelines, Hokuetsu took the precaution of obtaining a
favourable opinion on its share allocations from an independent committee
that included two of its outside corporate auditors, in order to protect itself
from accusations that its board had acted purely to protect its own
interests. The psychological impact of this affair was possibly even greater
than that of the Livedoor offer for NBS, because both Ōji and Hokuetsu
are mainstream industrial companies; if such things could happen between
companies such as this, many other companies would see themselves as
exposed to the possibility of a bid.
The result of these developments was that many Japanese companies
began to formulate defensive strategies against the possibility of takeover.
Although Livedoor and Ōji are both Japanese companies, much of the
concern was focused on the possibility of foreign acquirers becoming
active in Japan; increasingly aggressive moves by foreign private equity
firms had revived fears of foreign predators. Nihon Keizai Shimbun
reported in February 2007 that a total of 197 companies had announced
anti-takeover strategies (Nikkei, 2007). Stronger companies which we
visited in September 2006 considered that they were not at immediate risk.
The president of one company commented to us:
‘…if we create a situation whereby there is a reasonable profit distribution
and a sound share price, my feeling at present is that there is really no
need to introduce defensive measures, or any of the legal stuff that it
entails, in the immediate future. However, this all depends on the
situation’.
Nevertheless, his company already had a task force studying this topic.
In our contacts with companies and other entities, we asked why external
committees were considered necessary for approval of defensive measures
when companies could either put the matter to a vote of their shareholders
or even rely on their existing corporate auditors to monitor the actions of
the board (assuming that companies with committees would have external
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supervision already in place). In fact the schedule for calling general
meetings of shareholders in Japan makes it difficult to arrange voting
quickly in response to takeover approaches but we considered this to be a
logistical problem which could be solved if there was the appropriate will.
Perhaps the most revealing comment with regard to referring matters to
shareholders came from the chairman of a company who named a major
Japanese company with an aggregate majority of foreign shareholders as
an example of why it was not feasible just to leave reaction to bids and
defensive measures to the shareholders’ vote:
‘So if it became a question of someone trying to acquire [company name],
if a shareholders’ meeting were held - if they asked everyone to gather
together…51% would raise their hands and that would be the end of it,
wouldn’t it? There’s a huge risk of that, you see’.
This also illustrates a curious aspect of the current concern regarding
hostile takeovers. Foreign institutional investors have bought many of the
shares which have entered the market from the continuing relaxation of
mutual shareholdings mentioned above and data from the National Stock
Exchanges (Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Fukuoka and Sapporo) show an
almost unbroken rise in foreign shareholdings from 11.9% of the market in
1996 to 26.7% in 2005 (National Stock Exchanges, 2006). Despite the
fact that both Livedoor and Ōji Paper are Japanese companies, popular
belief tends to see foreign predators as the real threat. Approaches since
2003 by Steel Partners of the USA to several Japanese companies,
culminating in a formal approach to Sapporo Breweries in early 2007 to
acquire a controlling stake, and recent demands for higher dividends at
larger companies by foreign activist investors, have encouraged this view,
although none of these approaches have involved a hostile offer. The
removal in May 2007 of the ban on acquisition of Japanese companies by
locally registered subsidiaries of foreign companies using their parent’s
shares as currency (so-called ‘triangular transactions’) has prompted
speculation about what sort of threat this may represent. A survey of most
of the first and second section companies on the Tokyo Stock Exchange
by Nihon Keizai Shimbun, reported in its associated newspaper, Nikkei
Sangyō Shimbun on 26th April 2007 5, found that 48.2% of respondents
5

The survey was sent to 2,105 companies, of which 604 (28.7%) replied.
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considered that the risk of unwelcome attention from foreign acquirers
would increase. Although a similar 48.3% felt that nothing would change,
many of these based their opinion on the fact that there would be a
reaction from Japanese society as a whole (33.0%) or that crossshareholdings and the like would hold them at bay (22.4%). Moreover,
46.2% considered that incumbent management would be able to withstand
any approaches of this kind. Buy-out and other private equity funds
(which are not exclusively foreign but tend to be seen as a foreign
phenomenon) were seen as short-termist and harmful, although a
surprisingly high percentage of respondents (53.8%) conceded that they
created useful tension among managers (Nikkei Sangyō, 2007).
Many large Japanese companies continue to cater to the requirements of
foreign and domestic institutional shareholders through extensive IR
activities and it remains to be seen how this encouragement of
fundamentally uncommitted shareholders can eventually be reconciled
with growing concerns about the risk of hostile takeover (Jackson and
Miyajima, 2007, p.20, after Ahmadjian). The TSE noted that in 2006
some 8.3% of the first section of the Tokyo market, or 196 companies, had
30% or more of their total shares in the hands of foreign investors (TSE,
2007, p.4). As noted above, some companies are already owned more
than half in aggregate by foreign shareholders.
One very large company where we held interviews, which is a company
with committees, had announced in 2005 that if a potentially hostile party
gathered more than 20% of its shares it would form a special committee
from its external directors to consider countermeasures. In the face of
institutional pressure, the company subsequently obtained shareholder
approval for this concept and limited any defensive measures to one year.
This shows a certain deference to shareholder sentiment but the basic
principle remains that the board, albeit including external directors in this
case, will determine defensive measures. Moreover, this is a company that
probably takes its obligations to shareholders more seriously than many.
Reactions to the idea that corporate auditors might monitor the board’s use
of defensive measures were universally negative. An official at an
association said: ‘Now it may be, as you pointed out, that fundamentally
the corporate auditors should decide this, but in Japan no one thinks like
that’. An officer at another association made a similar comment: ‘I don’t
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think that Japanese law expects the board of corporate auditors itself to
decide whether an acquisition is good or not, or to do the sort of things
that determine how the company moves in any given direction’. A major
institutional investor conceded that external corporate auditors could have
some role – although he pointed to Hokuetsu as an example of how
ineffectual they had proved in practice – but saw them as only a secondbest solution:
‘I think that corporate auditors - especially internal corporate auditors have no independence. Our feeling here is that external directors - that is
to say, external directors who have independence - are the best solution.
Then, as the next best candidates, come external corporate auditors with a
high degree of independence; I think people like this should also be
permitted, but the highest priority is to have external directors with strong
independence’.
What is significant in this situation is that no one realistically seems to
expect that the boards of companies that feel threatened by potential
predators will relinquish control of defensive strategy. There is lack of
widespread acceptance that shareholders have a right to deliver companies
to whomsoever they choose, and a perception that the existing mechanism
of the corporate auditors, for the vast majority of Japanese companies
which are not companies with committees, is considered to be incapable of
restraining the board. Instead the focus has turned to ways in which the
actions of boards – which are generally accepted to be internally recruited
and motivated by corporate rather than shareholder considerations – can
be monitored by external forces to ensure that that they abstain from
egregiously self-interested policies. The feeling is that because boards are
sufficiently integrated into their community firms to be unlikely to act
from selfish interests, the need for external reconfirmation of their acts is a
precaution rather than an utter necessity.
The background to this situation is a general concern that the community
firm cannot be abandoned to the caprice of the market and a belief that
most boards will genuinely have their firm’s interests at heart. The
president of one company said:
‘I’m not quite sure whether shutting out these sorts of opportunities [i.e.
bid approaches] can really be called ‘corporate defence’. However - this is
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a Japanese sort of environment - the fact is that 6,000 people are working
in our group and hitherto they have always had a great feeling of
confidence and attachment towards the management. Accordingly, with
regard to philosophy, even if for the sake of argument someone were to
appear with a philosophy that was even more elevated than ours, I would
be very worried and doubtful as to whether these employees who are
currently contributing their confidence and attachment to us would
continue to do so in the same way for them’.
An officer at an association confirmed this view:
‘I think there is always the possibility that the incumbent management will
set defensive measures in motion in order to protect their own positions currently I believe that to be the case. But that’s where incumbent
management in Japan differs considerably from that of America, in
particular - and perhaps from that of the U.K. as well - in that, as I
mentioned earlier, their core is formed from people who have basically
spent all the past 20 or 30 years at the same company, entering as
employees - ordinary staff - and you might say that it revolves around
directors who are the internally promoted senior management; they are
managers but they also have the role of representing the entire workforce.
This is a logic that is very familiar to Japanese people but I think perhaps
it is not understood by people from outside’.
Ironically, the very fact that the vast majority of internally appointed
corporate directors are unlikely to relinquish control of their companies
has potentially created a stronger role for external directors and other
purveyors of independent advice whose objectivity might be recognised in
a court of law. Whether these external parties will really be capable of
preventing boards from rejecting offers which shareholders might consider
advantageous and which could conceivably offer employees a better future
as part of a more dynamic organisation, remains to be seen, but it does
seem likely that demand for external directors and advisers will increase.
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IV. ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION
The title of this paper suggests that the reaction of Japanese companies to
recent legal reforms is not quite what meets the eye. Their response has
been ‘paradoxical’ for two reasons.
The first is that the changes made to management style and practice did
not depend on whether the firm in question adopted the company with
committees system – many companies made the move to more streamlined
management and greater use of external advice without opting into the
new legal structure. Below the level of rhetoric about ‘traditionalists’ and
‘modernisers’, firms of both varieties were responding to the pressure to
restructure and reorganise their decision-making processes. Even within
the category of firms adopting the company with committees structure,
there was considerable variation, with some adopting a US-style system of
majority independent representation on the board, but most retaining a key
role for internal management at board level. At the three companies with
committees visited, executive management appeared to be still firmly in
control, with the ability of the external directors to intervene decisively at
some future stage still an unknown quantity. Thus the impact of the new
law has been complex. It has not, for the most part, provided a template
for abandoning the traditional form of the Japanese company; but it has
been part of a process which stimulated wider changes in managerial and
organisational practice.
The second paradox concerns the impact of these changes on the
underlying model of the Japanese firm. The Japanese company has long
been seen as an outlier, representing a particular model which, thanks to
certain historical contingencies and the inter-connectedness of its defining
features, ‘more or less contrasts with the corporate system found in the
West’ (Aoki, 1996, p.33). Does the adoption of certain ‘western’ practices
therefore mean that the distinctiveness of the Japanese firm will soon
fade? We suggest not. On the contrary, the theme that emerges most
strongly from our interviews is that the changes which are currently being
made in both governance and management are more likely to lead to a
renewal of the ‘community firm’, albeit in a somewhat modified form.
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A question we set out to address in this paper was: how much adoption of
a ‘global standard’ of corporate governance has occurred in Japan to date?
Taking as key elements of the ‘global standard’ the active participation in
corporate boards by independent external directors who exercise real
power and supervise corporate activities, and the segregation of
supervision and execution, the initial conclusion of this study is that not
much has happened. External supervision is more widespread and more
tolerated but is still of only limited effect: external directors are often
treated as advisers and the view that the executive board should be running
the business persists. There is some formal demarcation between
supervision and execution, principally in companies with committees, but
too many directors are still executives for this to be seen as a fundamental
shift. Indeed there is an instinctive opposition to the idea of directors
retreating from the executive sphere (Jacoby, 2005, p.170). Yet, this does
not imply that the corporate governance reforms have had no impact.
Both in companies with committees and those retaining traditional
structures of governance, there has been a move to streamline managerial
processes and make decision-making more flexible. The company law
reforms have provided a wider catalyst for change which is gradually
being diffused throughout the corporate sector of the economy.
The takeover debate has revealed some interesting aspects of corporate
governance in Japan in that there is widespread acceptance that most
boards are internally orientated – although there is little of the automatic
suspicion of their motives that agency theory might dictate – and that the
only reasonable way to ensure transparent fairness in a time of crisis is felt
to be the introduction of external parties into the process of reviewing
takeover defences. Consigning everything indiscriminately to the decision
of a majority of shareholders is not, however, considered an option, and no
one believes that corporate auditors could be trusted to police directors’
fulfilment of fiduciary obligations in a bid situation. Instead, the concept
of external supervision, which was so fiercely opposed by leaders of the
Japanese business world in 2001, is seen as a reasonable solution. Here,
again, changes are occurring, but not necessarily along the lines intended
or envisaged by those who see the establishment of a market for corporate
control as an essential step in the modernisation of the Japanese economy.
External supervision has the appearance of an ‘irritant’ factor (Teubner,
2001, p. 418) which has established itself in Japanese corporate

2007]

JAPAN’S PARADOXICAL RESPONSE

31

governance and is now adapting itself to a need that was not foreseen
when the initial debate began, at the end of the 1990s.
Were a US or British-style market for corporate control to come into
existence in Japan, it is doubtful that the traditional model of the Japanese
corporation, could survive for very long. However, the debate over antitakeover measures suggests that senior managers in Japan, in contrast to
their counterparts in the US and Britain (and to an increasing degree in
mainland Europe), do not see their primary duty, in the context of a
takeover bid, as maximising shareholder returns; instead they continue to
see themselves as having a responsibility to maintain the company as an
organisational entity, for the benefit of a range of interests. Here, as with
the company with committees system, an increased degree of externalism
is not incompatible with the renewal of the pre-existing model, and may,
indeed, be seen to be one of its preconditions.
Japan’s response to the ‘global standard’ thus appears to be that it has
absorbed certain ideas and practices but has adapted them to local
conditions. A hybrid is evolving which in some respects is ‘unlike either
the past Japanese model or the US model of corporate governance’
(Jackson and Miyajima, 2007, p.32). Some of the pressures apparent at
the beginning of this century from official initiatives, academic opinion
and self-doubt among the managing class appear to have abated. Many
companies are changing their styles of governance and related
management systems. This process of gradual change appears to have
restored the confidence of Japanese corporate management, leaving what
is mostly the traditional system in place but, if anything, more resilient
than it was before. The factor of increasingly tolerated external
supervision noted above is not the only change at work. Some Japanese
companies devote great attention to investor relations and have a higher
degree of transparency than in the past. This tendency is not universal and
one observer commented, ‘the good companies are getting better but the
bad companies aren’t changing anything’, but there is certainly a marked
change compared to 20 years ago at many major companies.
Strengthening internal controls has also become a matter of concern at
many companies and the new Company Law implemented in 2006
requires clearer demarcation of inspection duties. The quality of internal
controls is increasingly seen as a determinant of the quality of future
corporate governance and this may well have a profound impact, over the
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medium term, in the way companies are managed. Thus the general
picture is of a system embedded in robust social practices that has
emerged from a period of instability with its key elements intact, but
which is undergoing gradual modification. The pre-existing system of
Japanese corporate governance appears to be surviving well and has not
been swept away by a ‘global standard’. Part of its strength lies in its
ability to absorb new elements to amend the details, though not the core,
of its structure.
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